一架和五角大樓失去聯(lián)系的B52轟炸機孤獨地承載著毀滅世界的任務(wù)。
    一路昂揚地飛過身下美麗的高山大河，平原深谷，飛過歐洲大陸，飛向蘇聯(lián)……
　　配樂是一段在原聲帶里被命名為《炸彈快跑》（Bomb Run）的無歌詞男聲哼唱。
　　
　　無歌詞哼唱用得是地方的話，能起到插曲和配樂沒有的奇效。
　　《奇愛博士》里這一段就很動人，記憶里只有《一個和八個》開頭日出時候的那段可以比。
　　以下是對這段配樂出處的考證過程。
　　
　　1.關(guān)于《奇愛博士》里一段配樂的問題
　　《奇愛博士》里面用得很多的一段，最早出現(xiàn)是在10分左右，B52轟炸機向基地確認(rèn)了用核武器襲擊蘇聯(lián)的R計劃的時候。
　　音樂是軍號伴著鼓點，調(diào)子很好聽，很振奮。像在給出征的戰(zhàn)士鼓勁兒似的。
　　
　　最早聽到它是在一首joan baez歌<Johnny I hardly knew ye>，演唱年代不祥，大致在五十到七十年代之間。歌詞是以一個傷兵妻子的口吻寫的，是反戰(zhàn)的。因為調(diào)子很明快上口，我一聽之下覺得應(yīng)該是很有名的歌，但搜索歌詞，卻發(fā)現(xiàn)歌詞居然沒有統(tǒng)一的版本，和joan baez相關(guān)的網(wǎng)頁也不多。這可能說明這首歌早就有了，且有很多人翻唱過。后查到歌詞節(jié)選改編自愛爾蘭詩人Padraic Colum（1881－1972）1922年編選的一本愛爾蘭詩集里的一首詩，是沒有留下作者的民歌。民歌里出現(xiàn)的地點Athy也是一個愛爾蘭地名。
　　
　　那這段音樂是不是專門為這首詩譜的曲？還是它本來是一段軍樂，后來有人取反諷之意，改成了反戰(zhàn)的民謠？
　　
　　繼聽過joan baez的版本后，又在一個月之內(nèi)聽到過兩次這個調(diào)子。一是在Sex and the City里，主角Carrie和人閑聊的時候說到和戰(zhàn)爭有關(guān)的話題，Carrie表示她對此有所了解，就哼了一小句。
　　二是看電視頻道換到某臺在演《女子特警隊》，隊員們受訓(xùn)時給她們放投影的軍事教學(xué)片，那個好像是國外軍隊演習(xí)的場面配的也是這段音樂。
　　據(jù)此我覺得它最初是一段軍樂的可能性比較大，那它是哪一國的軍樂，從什么時候開始有的呢？
　　
　　2.糊涂了
　　其實有了dr. strangelove這么有名的片子答案是不難找的
　　算是部分答案吧：
　　The score for the B-52 scenes is mostly made up of the melody of "Johnny, I Hardly Knew Ye", a traditional Irish anti-war song, which also provides the melody for the somewhat better-known (at least in the United States) American Civil War song "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again". While the former tells the story of a soldier coming back from a war heavily mutilated and broken, with the last lines being "They're rolling out the guns again, but they'll never take my sons again", the latter describes the celebrations that will take place when the soldiers return from war: "The men will cheer and the boys will shout / The ladies they will all turn out / And we'll all feel gay / When Johnny comes marching home."
　　
　　美國南北戰(zhàn)爭期間，一位愛爾蘭裔南方軍隊樂隊指揮Patrick S. Gilmore把一首抗議英格蘭征兵的愛爾蘭反戰(zhàn)民歌Johnny,I Hardly Knew ye（《強尼，我快認(rèn)不出你了》）改成了歡迎戰(zhàn)士凱旋的歌When Johnny Comes Marching Home（《當(dāng)強尼凱旋歸家時》）。
　　事實上，這首曲調(diào)上口的歌在戰(zhàn)時廣為流傳，南北方的軍民都在唱。
　　
　　carrie是時尚女，她如果知道一首古老的愛爾蘭民歌是奇怪的，但她知道南北戰(zhàn)爭的歌并用它來表達對“戰(zhàn)爭“的了解，就很容易解釋了。
　　女子特警隊員看的教學(xué)片很有可能是關(guān)于美國的。
　　
　　老庫的心思一向用得很狠，此處對待戰(zhàn)爭的兩層潛文本也算一例。
　　他這部片子里的戲謔、瘋狂和黑暗與johnny,i hardly knew ye是一致的。johnny這樣形似armless,boneless,chickenless egg的怪物，和核彈一樣，都是人類不斷進步的必然產(chǎn)物，它們既是人性的，也是非人性的，既是原始野蠻的，也是現(xiàn)代文明的。它們的產(chǎn)生和侵蝕對于人類而言是不可避免的，而所有一切的終結(jié)，就和dr.strangelove的結(jié)局一樣，是一場美麗的終極毀滅。
　　
　　3.補上這兩首歌的歌詞
　　1）.When johnny comes marching home again
　　This is generally credited to the Union Army bandmaster, Patrick S. Gilmore, who wrote it in 1863. It is similar to the Irish song Johnny I Hardly Knew Ye(a tale of a maimed soldier returning from war). Which version came first is debated.
　　
　　When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again,
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　We'll give him a hearty welcome then
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　The men will cheer and the boys will shout
　　The ladies they will all turn out
　　And we'll all feel gay,
　　When Johnny comes marching home.
　　
　　The old church bell will peal with joy
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　To welcome home our darling boy
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　The village lads and lassies say
　　With roses they will strew the way,
　　And we'll all feel gay
　　When Johnny comes marching home.
　　
　　Get ready for the Jubilee,
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　We'll give the hero three times three,
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　The laurel wreath is ready now
　　To place upon his loyal brow
　　And we'll all feel gay
　　When Johnny comes marching home.
　　
　　2）.Johnny, I Hardly Knew Ye
　　
　　By Anonymous
　　Padraic Colum (1881–1972). Anthology of Irish Verse. 1922.
　　
　　WHILE going the road to sweet Athy,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　While going the road to sweet Athy,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　While going the road to sweet Athy,
　　A stick in my hand and a drop in my eye,
　　A doleful damsel I heard cry:
　　 “Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　
　　“With drums and guns, and guns and drums,
　　The enemy nearly slew ye;
　　My darling dear, you look so queer,
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　
　　“Where are your eyes that looked so mild?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are your eyes that looked so mild?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are your eyes that looked so mild,
　　When my poor heart you first beguiled?
　　Why did you run from me and the child?
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“Where are the legs with which you run?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are thy legs with which you run?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are the legs with which you run
　　When first you went to carry a gun?
　　Indeed, your dancing days are done!
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　It grieved my heart to see you sail,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　It grieved my heart to see you sail,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　It grieved my heart to see you sail,
　　Though from my heart you took leg-bail;
　　Like a cod you’re doubled up head and tail,
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“You haven’t an arm and you haven’t a leg,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　You haven’t an arm and you haven’t a leg,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　You haven’t an arm and you haven’t a leg,
　　You’re an eyeless, noseless, chickenless egg;
　　You’ll have to be put with a bowl to beg:
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“I’m happy for to see you home,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　I’m happy for to see you home,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　I’m happy for to see you home,
　　All from the Island of Sulloon;
　　So low in flesh, so high in bone;
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“But sad it is to see you so,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　But sad it is to see you so,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　But sad it is to see you so,
　　And to think of you now as an object of woe,
　　Your Peggy’ll still keep you on as her beau;
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　
　　With drums and guns, and guns and drums,
　　The enemy nearly slew ye;
　　My darling dear, you look so queer,
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye.
　　
　　3）．Johnny I hardly knew ye（joan baez演唱版，附試譯）
　　
　　Joan Baze常常以簡單的配樂襯托她同樣簡單卻在樸實中見動人之處的聲音。她演繹的這首老歌，除了表示妻子堅定信念的最后一節(jié)的伴唱，模擬軍樂隊的打鼓聲壓倒了其他所有隱約可辨的配樂。歌聲和鼓點相呼應(yīng)，節(jié)奏感強烈得仿佛一首軍歌，而她歌唱的是這樣一個在戰(zhàn)爭中失去四肢和雙眼的士兵，驚悚、殘忍、痛苦和反諷纏繞在一起，直到最后妻子唱出自己的決心：再也不讓那些制造槍支的人奪走他們的孩子。
　　然而，那是她能決定的事嗎？對于那些人她又是什么呢？
　　也許，她只是平凡，渺小，普通，充滿著世界各個角落的墊在金字塔最底層的奴隸，而這個世界屬于奧林匹亞山上的少數(shù)神明，為了永遠不能到達的“永恒”，讓他們主宰的藝術(shù)世界成為可能，艱難地活著的人類的痛苦不得不永續(xù)不熄。
　　戰(zhàn)爭，永遠睡在你我身邊，凡人不知道她什么時候醒來。
　　
　　With your guns and drums
　　And drums and guns
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　With your guns and drums
　　And drums and guns
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　With your guns and drums
　　And drums and guns
　　The enemy nearly slew ye
　　My darling，dear，you look so queer
　　Johnny i hardly knew ye
　　帶著你的槍和鼓和鼓和槍
　　帶著你的槍和鼓和鼓和槍
　　帶著你的槍和鼓和鼓和槍
　　敵人差點殺了你
　　我心愛的，親愛的，你看起來這樣怪異
　　強尼，我差點認(rèn)不出你
　　
　　Where are your legs that used to run
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your legs that used to run
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your legs that used to run
　　Before you left carrying a gun
　　I fear your dancing days are done
　　Johnny I hardly knew ye
　　你過去習(xí)慣奔跑的雙腿在哪里？
　　你過去習(xí)慣奔跑的雙腿在哪里？
　　你過去習(xí)慣奔跑的雙腿在哪里？
　　在你持槍離開前（習(xí)慣奔跑的雙腿）
　　我怕你跳舞的日子結(jié)束了
　　強尼，我差點認(rèn)不出你
　　
　　Where are your eyes that were so mild
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your eyes that were so mild
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your eyes that were so mild
　　When my heart you did beguile
　　And why did ye run from me and the child
　　Johnny I hardly knew ye
　　你過去如此溫和的雙眼在哪里？
　　你過去如此溫和的雙眼在哪里？
　　你過去如此溫和的雙眼在哪里？
　　那時你讓我的心陶醉
　　可你為什么離開我和孩子
　　強尼，我差點認(rèn)不出你
　　
　　Ye haven't an arm ye haven't a leg
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Ye haven't an arm ye haven't a leg
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Ye haven't an arm ye haven't a leg
　　Ye're an armless boneless chickenless egg
　　and ye'll have to be put with a bowl to beg
　　Johnny I hardly knew ye
　　你沒有胳臂，你沒有腿
　　你沒有胳臂，你沒有腿
　　你沒有胳臂，你沒有腿
　　你是一只沒有胳膊，沒有腿也沒有小雞的蛋
　　你不得不和一只碗放在一起去乞討
　　強尼，我差點認(rèn)不出你
　　
　　They're rolling out the guns again
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　They're rolling out the guns again
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　They're rolling out the guns again
　　But they won't take back our sons again
　　No they never take back our sons again
　　Johnny I'm swearing to ye
　　他們又在大量制造槍支
　　他們又在大量制造槍支
　　他們又在大量制造槍支
　　但他們再也不會收回我們的兒子們
　　不，他們永遠不會再次收回我們的兒子們
　　強尼，我向你發(fā)誓
　　
　　附記：
　　
　　庫布里克除了喜歡改編別人的小說，也喜歡用前人的音樂，尤其是古典音樂配現(xiàn)代的非人性的場景。經(jīng)典的比如《發(fā)條橙子》里的貝多芬，如《2001太空漫游》里的《查拉圖斯特拉如是說》和《藍色多瑙河》。有人說，在這部電影里聽《藍色多瑙河》，心里咒罵著庫布里克真是個天才，自己也快想發(fā)瘋了。
　　人性與非人性的探討也許是庫布里克最核心的關(guān)注點。
　　他的高明在于他沒有完全站在理性、文明、民主、自由的一方而對alex、jack、dr. strangelove這些現(xiàn)代畸形人完全持譴責(zé)批判的態(tài)度。這些人所呈現(xiàn)的非人性可能也是人性不可或缺的一部分，他的故事把他們與奉行現(xiàn)代社會框定的“善”之價值的人們共同呈現(xiàn)在一個個瘋狂的境遇下，讓觀眾自己思考。這就不難理解他為什么不喜歡《斯巴達克思》，恨不能把它從作品列表里刪除，因為它一邊倒，它是“人性”的，太“人性”的了。

(PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORKER, BY ERIC SCHLOSSER, ON JANUARY 23, 2014)

This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.

The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATO officers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?

With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”

President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.

In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.

* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”

After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.

Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.

The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.

The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”

Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.

While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”

The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”

A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.

In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.

“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.



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AND THIS IS REALLY COOL:
Top secret documents released by the Pentagon:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-of-nuclear-war.html