電影版的敲板定音，不禁地讓我想起那段閱讀The Time Traveler's Wife的陰霾時光?？傆X得這個故事的基調(diào)深邃而不黯然，如同封面上的墨綠。如今發(fā)布的電影版劇照和海報也沿襲了這一基調(diào)。唯一美中不足的是，劇照中飾演亨利的巴納身材十分壯碩，與閱讀時想象中的結(jié)實瘦感大相徑庭。導演從之前說好的Gus Van Sant到現(xiàn)在的Robert Schwentke，而且還選擇在圣誕節(jié)當天發(fā)行，很難不讓人懷疑制作公司的商業(yè)取向。至于，電影的期待值會不會因此走低，尚不能枉下定論，我們只能拭目以待。在期待正式公映之前，不妨說說閱讀時的一些關(guān)乎時代的體認。期許導演也能發(fā)現(xiàn)，這層夾在時間驅(qū)動下情感與現(xiàn)實的沖突。

　　讀完《時間旅行者的妻子》,是若干個晚上在自習室伴隨著某些人瘋狂磕教科書下實現(xiàn)的。
　　
　　本書作者奧德麗·尼芬格在文學表現(xiàn)力和情節(jié)的創(chuàng)造力、張力上的表現(xiàn)是大家有目共睹的。從亨利和克萊爾的第一次邂逅到以后無數(shù)次的“約會”，再到亨利的死去及克萊爾的等待，奧德麗無不以平淡的情節(jié)描寫來敘述這一次次的時間旅行，給作為第三者來經(jīng)歷這些時間旅行的我們一個客觀思考的空間，在里面我們沒有看到常出現(xiàn)在一些所謂的“暢銷書”里華麗到主觀控制的辭藻。而以男女主人公為視角的時空交叉描寫，我想應(yīng)該是文學從電影上借鑒而來的表現(xiàn)手法。這樣的手法，頗具辯證性，而且用在時間旅行的這樣一個題材上是再恰當不過的了。無論你從亨利的角度還是克萊爾的角度去讀，都具備合理性，因為他們思考問題的方式和角度不一樣，這也常常會發(fā)生在我們的現(xiàn)實生活中。更何況，他們還時空交錯。
　　
　　我想，作者能寫出這樣的故事并不只是根據(jù)自己的職業(yè)異想天開從而虛構(gòu)一段幻想中的科幻愛情。而跟我們當下的時代背景也有所關(guān)聯(lián)。現(xiàn)代人，尤其是生活在一些工業(yè)化、市場經(jīng)濟過分發(fā)展的城市人，往往因為市場的大眾價值觀的引導而被抹平自身原有的棱角，人人自危地追逐著工業(yè)機器的急速運轉(zhuǎn)的加速度。然后自豪地說“瞧！我把時間都貢獻給了工業(yè)社會！”注意，是工業(yè)社會，而非社會。社會并不僅僅是市場和工業(yè)。然而，在我們所貢獻出去的東西當中，能力和時間的比例是多少？我們大多數(shù)人不過是把能力最小化，而時間最大化了，僅此而已。留給自己的時間大量流失，往往讓我們找不到自我，抑或是，有所愛有所衷，卻來不及，更甚者，不敢去行動。因為我們已經(jīng)身陷時間怪圈的泥沼，不可自拔。這是現(xiàn)實中的時錯癥。然而，同一性存在于個體性，我們心里蠢蠢欲動的欲望總在春風拂起之時，悄悄地在灰燼中重生，開始似乎是早已注定生死循環(huán)。而《時間旅行者的妻子》大概就是新芽破土那一剎那的靈感。相遇、相知、死亡、再見。循環(huán)。亨利的時錯癥無疑是象征著現(xiàn)代社會里人被時間駕馭的生存狀態(tài) - 身不由己，而克萊爾則是另一種獨立于社會節(jié)奏之外的一種藝術(shù)家的生存態(tài)度 - 為愛而生、我行我素。兩人在爭分奪秒的戰(zhàn)爭中與時間博弈，死亡在這時也不過是另一場博弈的開始。這場戰(zhàn)爭沒有輸贏。命運和他們倆最終妥協(xié)，用面對死亡來交換一場經(jīng)歷過極刑的約會。命運玩弄了他們，而他們也沒讓命運盡興。算是各得其所吧。
　　
　　雋永的愛情固然可貴，但并非每個人都敢去追求。以愛因斯坦的相對論為基礎(chǔ)的話，我們完全有理由相信在足夠長的年份后錯時癥興風作浪的可能性。但至少，在這個世界還在正常邊緣的時候，我不甘愿當一個被動的時間旅行者。他們的女兒阿阿爾芭就做到了掌控時間。也許，對于現(xiàn)在的我們，亨利和克萊爾的故事算是針對錯時癥的一劑免疫。
　　
　　不駕馭時間，就被被時間駕馭。
　　
　　勇敢去愛吧！

P.S. 基于豆瓣需要評分后才能發(fā)表，我暫且先給予小說應(yīng)得的評分。待公映觀影過后再來修改；P

——當我在窗前目睹我的死亡
哦，親愛的
你是否還是憂傷
你是否還在甘草地上 為我準備衣裳

“We walked in fields of golden hay.
I still recall you.
We walked in fields of golden hay.
I see you in the summer.”
    在看到小卡萊爾在那個溫暖柔軟的午后在草地上飛奔向亨利的時候，耳邊忽然就響起了這首旋律，The Cranberries小紅莓的《Joe——我在夏天看見你。走在一片片金黃色干草地》。
    很輕，也很清晰，彷如他們的初遇。
    又或許，誰才是誰的初遇。
    是他隱藏在濃密樹叢中叫對了她的名字，還是她在圖書館大廳里的如遇故人。
    是她的，還是他的迷惑。
    終于，F(xiàn)inally，我遇見你。
    也終于，我不再對癡迷的時間理論平行宇宙揣摩不停，只是看一部很簡單的電影，一個只與愛和等待有關(guān)的故事。

“你打獵嗎？”
“通常我是被追捕的那個。”
“生活就像狩獵?！?br>……
    其實，生活也像隱喻。
    當亨利與克萊爾的父親在餐桌上談話時，亨利恐怕永遠也想不到這便是他今后的命運，即使時間旅行百萬次也無法改變的命運——被自己的岳父親手用獵槍打死。













——我的旅行
僅僅是遇見你
然后死去

i met a girl. 亨利坐在破舊的地鐵車廂，搓著手，忐忑并滿懷希翼的對面前的這位女士如是說。她是亨利30多年前還在世的母親，時光荏苒，上天竟然會如此眷顧一個人，讓他可以回溯到過去的時光和逝去的親人對話，雖然面前的她并不知道，亨利臨走時和她母親的最后一句話是，你的兒子非常的愛您。樹欲靜而風不止。

 

i met a girl 這一年，亨利36歲，克萊爾6歲。郎騎竹馬來，雖然在這個輪回里，克萊爾的白馬王子沒有腳踏七彩祥云甚至穿的像模像樣來見克萊爾一面，相反確是以一種荒誕狼狽的狀態(tài)下見面，卻絲毫沒有減輕一絲這個人日后在克萊爾心目中的分量，或許在跨越了數(shù)十年的風塵仆仆的時空中相遇，其他的已經(jīng)不復(fù)重要。在冥冥中降臨的那一瞬，偉大的造物主也許饒有興趣的看著他的杰作微微一曬。

 

i met a girl 這一年，亨利28歲，克萊爾20歲。杜拉斯說，愛之于我，并非肌膚之親，一蔬一飯，它是一種不死的欲望，是疲憊生活里面的英雄夢想。這是一個視愛情重于生命的瘋狂女人。所幸的是，生命中這樣的人不是她一個。亨利對克萊爾說，假如說這個世界上還有什么能讓我割舍不下，那就是你，你愿意嫁給我嗎？雖然是一個怪胎，但依然不失獲得真摯愛情的機會。愛情如果沒有變得簡單，是因為愛的還不夠深。

 

i met a girl 這一年亨利31歲，克萊爾23歲，他們終于走到了一起，這是一段時空交錯的愛情，即使在典禮當天，亨利也不知所蹤，但這是他人生中最為珍貴的時間，即使是在十年之后，他依然行色匆匆來到這一天，只為了履行那一句不離不棄生死相依的，我愿意。

 

i met a girl 這是亨利生命中數(shù)不勝數(shù)的時光穿越中最為欣喜的一次，在這里，他遇到了10歲的女孩，阿爾吧，她的女兒。在克萊爾受孕失敗數(shù)次后，心灰意冷的他得知了這個消息。前幾天，我的小侄女剛出生，我去醫(yī)院看到過這樣一個神奇的小生命，這是造物主的杰作，感謝他讓人類生生不息。

 

i met a girl 這一年，她82歲，他43歲。假如在世界上，還有什么可以阻止他們。那只有他們自己，跨越了時間，生命的界限的愛情，是永生的。

 

i met a girl 你我同歲。但卻對愛情有著截然不同的看法，這導致我們的人生在一段不短的交集之后逐漸漸行漸遠。這不用歸咎于孰是孰非，只是不知道你會不會懂得，在片尾逐漸消逝的字幕面前，我就如同看到我們彼此所共同享有的回憶逐寸斑駁而默然。煢煢白兔，東奔西顧，衣不如新，人不如故。

 

i met a girl 但那都不曾是你。

 

后記：這是從去年3月的瑞典電影血色入侵以來最為精彩的一部電影。和小說一起看的，互為補充。強烈推薦。

很久沒有看到一部使我感動到掉淚的愛情電影，我想了又想回味了又再回味，這一切都關(guān)乎于那些似乎存在又似乎只是幻想的情結(jié)，

是的，或許每個女人都希望自己是克萊爾，都幻想著在自己還是孩童時遇見的某個男人會是自己命中注定的男人，會幻想現(xiàn)在所經(jīng)歷的一切只是為了遇見那個男人。說到底，女人都過于相信宿命。
我想robert schwentke也是。

我感動得點是在于，唏噓原來所有人都沒有能力改變宿命，所有的一切在冥冥之中早已設(shè)定好。我喜歡這樣的宿命論。我竟然是這樣一個宿命控。

因為我愛你，所以命運讓多年后的我遇見多年前的你，因為我愛你，現(xiàn)在的你會義無反顧的愛上現(xiàn)在一無所知的我，因為我愛你，我會一直等待那個消失的你。所有的一切，只是因為我愛你。無論命運怎么安排，我還是愛你，我還是會在一個時間擁抱你，我還是會坐在草地上等待你，一生耗盡，只因我愛你。

原諒我，我是多么希望這樣一種充滿了宿命色彩的愛情，我是多么相信一直有那么一個人會是我的命中注定就想片中男女主角一樣。

無論生活如何，我們都需要一些美好的夢想。正如一切也不過是場美夢，一場只關(guān)于我愛你的夢。

一、多個時空


《純粹理性批判》中的第一經(jīng)驗類比（Analogies of Experience）要求在現(xiàn)象中有一個恒定且唯一之物來表象意識中的時間本身。恒定，或永恒，因為作為總體的時間本身是始終在那的；惟一，因為只有一個時間。這個惟一且永恒的東西，即現(xiàn)象中的實體（Substance）。康德明確把這個實體與洛克的托子（Substratum）區(qū)分開來，認為實體是以各種方式顯現(xiàn)于人的，而不是像托子那樣不可知，也不顯現(xiàn)。

我要說，洛克的托子的作用是保證物的個體化與同一性。這個作用在康德那兒，似乎是由物自體和先驗范疇共同完成。先驗范疇組織現(xiàn)象，在使意識對現(xiàn)象的認識成為可能的同時，也使同一的意識本身成為可能——對先驗對象的構(gòu)成即對自我的構(gòu)成。而物自體在這個過程中究竟如何起作用，不詳?？档碌奈镒泽w與洛克的托子一樣，是個讓理論顯得尷尬，卻又不得不進行的假設(shè)。

盡管康德反復(fù)說現(xiàn)象中的實體不是洛克的托子，但這個實體究竟是什么，他又語焉不詳。出于他對牛頓力學的接受，有人嘗試將其理解為牛頓意義上的質(zhì)量。我論證過，這樣的解讀將面臨一個兩難困境：如果實體是個體化了的質(zhì)量，時間便不是惟一的；如果實體是現(xiàn)象世界中的總質(zhì)量，基于二律背反的理由——這個總體無法成為經(jīng)驗對象——我們便無法經(jīng)驗到它。（詳細論述見篇末附錄）

若是跳出康德闡釋，取前一個困境：時間不是惟一的，每個作為現(xiàn)象的物都意味著一個獨立的時間體系，我們就科幻了：空間中的一個一個的物，奠基著意識中的一個又一個時間系，我們可以生活在不同的時空中，當我們經(jīng)驗不同的物。甚至，對應(yīng)地說，我們總在成為另一個人，當我們來到不同的時空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作對康德的一次失敗卻有趣的解讀。與其說他是一位時間旅行者，一位不停地穿越時空的超人或可憐人，不如說，他的意識中并沒有一個絕對惟一的時間，他所來到并離開的每一個時空，都是一個獨立自在的世界，盡管這些世界看上去很像，但哪個都不依賴于另一個——從理念的意義上說。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解釋為一種不治的遺傳疾病。沒有理由地，他時不時就去了另一個時空，赤身裸體地尋找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人來到一個新的環(huán)境，總是迫不及待地尋找一個身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利總會在一個無從預(yù)料的時刻消失，克萊爾生活在一個不確定的世界中。她的愛情是確定的，但她愛的人不確定地存在著。她的生活中彌漫著不確定性，而這恰好讓她格外珍惜亨利在她身邊的每一分鐘。

克萊爾一次次懷孕又一次次流產(chǎn)，因為胎兒也有穿越癥，莫名其妙地，便在某個時刻，出離了子宮。但克萊爾最后一次懷孕時，對亨利說，你每次消失都是因為感覺到了壓力。所以，從現(xiàn)在開始，我要保持絕對地平靜，這樣胎兒就可以順利出生了。
看到這里，我恍然大悟，原來亨利的穿越癥是個隱喻，關(guān)于男人的隱喻：面對壓力，便會沉默與回避，這不正是男人的本能反應(yīng)么——而這在女人看來，仿佛愛人去了另一個時空，不知何時才能回來，甚至，會不會回來。

我查了查，電影改編自一位女造型藝術(shù)家的首部小說，寫于一段失敗的戀情之后。原來如此。

很多年前聽到過一個說法：愛情，對男人來說，是掛在墻上的一幅畫，你并不總是去看它；但對女人來說，則是房間里音樂，你想不聽都不行。所以，男人需要時不時地呆在純?nèi)粚儆谧晕业氖澜缋?，在沉默中成為自己。女人卻要認為這是對她的疏遠、對親密的疏離，并因此而坐立不安，想方設(shè)法闖進那份鐵一般的沉默。結(jié)果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把愛情撞碎。
這是對小兒女情態(tài)的描述。若成年點，便會更同情于另一個說法：人生在世，無非是男人討慰藉，女人討生活。人并不總是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之時。人卻總在生活，就算你不想。


三、看著，卻無法改變


在一次穿越中，亨利來到母親身邊，在地鐵里，母親在看報，他們作為陌生人簡短卻親切的交談了一會兒。亨利告訴母親，他要結(jié)婚了，這個女孩讓他感到安全。
克萊爾問他：你什么不去阻止那場車禍，既然你可以回到車禍發(fā)生之前。“我無法阻止。無數(shù)次我回到過去，回到母親還在的時候，但每次我都無法改變發(fā)生著的一切?！薄@話讓人特別難過。我們并不能改變過去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多時候，我們從自己當下的境遇中抽身而出，試圖站在一個更開闊的角度，超脫地看現(xiàn)在的糾結(jié)、焦慮，或苦悶，并自嘲這些都沒什么的。但當你身在當下，你知道未來的自己就坐在對面，笑著，看著自己，慈悲地。但你還是無法因此脫身而出。你仍然只能呆在你當下的處境中，無論是過分的快樂，還是仿佛無法掙脫的哀傷。

每一個時刻都是三維的，它包含著過去、現(xiàn)在，和未來這三個維度。我們在回憶中編輯時間，編輯自己，有意無意地遺忘一些，并把另一些反復(fù)摩挲。過往明明滅滅，像晴天里，隨風晃動的百葉窗投在墻上的影子。每次回憶之后，我們都成為另一個人。
未來也是。未來無數(shù)次作為想象呈現(xiàn)于當下，各式各樣地，仿佛清晰的回憶。回憶與憧憬，如同天平的兩臂，對稱著，平衡著，在現(xiàn)在這個支點上。所以，現(xiàn)在這個時刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚會時，亨利中槍后痛苦掙扎的裸體突然出現(xiàn)在他們的門廳里。又消失了?？巳R爾說，我從沒見過四十歲之后的你。我見過的你總是很年輕。從這個時候起，死亡就成了他們中的另一個在場者，盡管它總是沉默著。

亨利穿越到未來，遇見了自己的已經(jīng)十歲的女兒。女兒告訴他，他死于自己五歲那年。她們一直很想念他。那時他們的女兒還沒出生。那時克萊爾還一如既往地希望與亨利白頭偕老，就像她還沒長大時那樣，就像她長大之后第一次遇到亨利時那樣，就像亨利死后，她仍然留著亨利所有的衣服，等著亨利回來那樣。

于她而言，亨利是不會死的。他無非是走遠了一下子回不來，他無非是在時空中迷了路，找不到一件讓他溫暖的衣服。

女兒五歲那年，亨利和克萊爾都已知道，亨利即將死去，中彈而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一個時刻。在它到來之前，所有相聚的時光都是銘刻，都是用最日常的方式來進行的一次祭奠，一次追憶。當這個期限還不確定，他們相愛著，仿佛一對最平凡的戀人；當這個期限已然確定，他們相愛著，裝作不知道他們即將分離。

一個期限并不見得讓期限到來之前的一切都顯得美好。但，美好的東西都有一個期限。確定的期限，或不確定的期限。你不能試圖挽留，那會猶如握緊手中的細沙，握得越緊，便流失得越快，宛如時間，從指縫間悄然流走。
這個期限是否到來，何時到來，都不是你能選擇的。你能做的，僅僅是在它到來之前的每一刻，不讓自己在未來后悔——克萊爾明白這些，并且，她做到了。

而，這不正是人生么。


——————
附錄：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…h(huán)ere the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.