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時(shí)間旅行者的妻子

愛(ài)情片美國(guó)2009

主演:瑞秋·麥克亞當(dāng)斯  艾瑞克·巴納  阿萊克斯·費(fèi)瑞斯  艾利斯·霍華德    

導(dǎo)演:羅伯特·斯文克    

 劇照

時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.1時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.2時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.3時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.4時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.5時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.6時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.13時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.14時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.15時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.16時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.17時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.18時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.19時(shí)間旅行者的妻子 劇照 NO.20
更新時(shí)間:2024-11-06 16:01

詳細(xì)劇情

一場(chǎng)車(chē)禍,母親喪生,而孩子卻奇跡般幸存,他赤裸著身體獲救,然而救人者竟然是來(lái)自未來(lái)的自己。原來(lái),這個(gè)名叫亨利的圖書(shū)管理員,患上慢性時(shí)間錯(cuò)位癥,以至于每次發(fā)病都將穿越時(shí)空。而且,他每次穿越都赤身裸體,經(jīng)常鬧出笑話(huà)。久而久之,亨利習(xí)以為常。一個(gè)偶然的機(jī)會(huì),他愛(ài)上了一個(gè)名叫克萊爾的女孩。為了追求克萊爾,他穿越時(shí)空對(duì)6歲的克萊爾表白,并許諾未來(lái)將娶她為妻。因此,當(dāng)亨利在現(xiàn)實(shí)中出現(xiàn)時(shí),兩人迅速熱戀、結(jié)婚,而且還生了一個(gè)女孩。但是,亨利的老毛病依舊無(wú)法改變,所以克萊爾必須適應(yīng)這個(gè)穿越時(shí)空的老公,兩人也因此歷經(jīng)磨難……

 長(zhǎng)篇影評(píng)

 1 ) 失敗的編劇

《時(shí)間旅行者的妻子》可以說(shuō)是我最?lèi)?ài)的一本書(shū),還特意買(mǎi)了英文原版來(lái)看。書(shū)中所描述的復(fù)雜的人性,藝術(shù)家的靈動(dòng),和跨越時(shí)間的愛(ài)以及對(duì)音樂(lè),詩(shī)歌等等主題的探討都讓我魂?duì)繅?mèng)繞??梢哉f(shuō),原著作者將生活瑣事都描寫(xiě)的非常具有藝術(shù)性。
可是?。?!看來(lái)電影以后非常失望。首先,克萊爾和書(shū)中描寫(xiě)完全不一樣。沒(méi)有藝術(shù)家的那種氣質(zhì),沒(méi)有克萊爾那種不守規(guī)矩卻又溫潤(rùn)的感覺(jué)。最基本的,克萊爾的頭發(fā)怎么不是書(shū)中描寫(xiě)的顏色?中年后怎么居然剪短發(fā)了?編劇難道沒(méi)有看過(guò)書(shū)中描寫(xiě),“亨利甚至認(rèn)為我的頭發(fā)具有獨(dú)立的人格”嗎?
其次,貫穿全書(shū)的一些關(guān)鍵人物和元素都沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)。金太,露西爾(克萊爾的媽媽?zhuān)⒏覃惖?,貫穿全?shū)的詩(shī)歌,那首經(jīng)典的“world enough, and time(世界夠大,時(shí)間夠多)”全部都沒(méi)有。這些元素本來(lái)使人物更加豐滿(mǎn),讓我們更加理解他們的愛(ài)和世界,透過(guò)那些詩(shī)歌也更加理解這本書(shū),以及永恒的愛(ài)的主題。
此外,編劇只是流水賬一般的敘述故事,對(duì)原著的刪改可以說(shuō)是到了去其精華取其糟粕的程度。愛(ài)爾芭按照書(shū)中的描寫(xiě),應(yīng)該是跟亨利非常相似,黑發(fā)聰慧的小女孩,可電影中竟然是金發(fā)!在遇到克萊爾之前,亨利混亂的生活也僅僅以一只口紅帶過(guò)。過(guò)最另人無(wú)法忍受的是,編劇竟然篡改了結(jié)尾,去掉了經(jīng)典的遺書(shū)和克萊爾82歲時(shí)的相遇。少了這一點(diǎn),這個(gè)故事還怎么能體現(xiàn)“時(shí)間算不了什么”?
少了這些詩(shī)歌,藝術(shù),人物,甚至還可以加上美食,整個(gè)故事被篡改的面目全非,深度全無(wú),而變成了一個(gè)毫無(wú)深度和藝術(shù)性的老套愛(ài)情悲劇。

 2 ) I love you without time and place ,I just love you

我在往返與英國(guó)的飛機(jī)法航上看了這部影片

雖然是英文版本,但是每次看完都是淚流滿(mǎn)面

“我在六歲那年第一次遇見(jiàn)他。這個(gè)憑空出現(xiàn)的裸體男人,帶著熟悉溫暖的微笑,像個(gè)天使。于是我把我的紅色毯子借給了他??粗饾u的消失,他對(duì)我說(shuō),他還會(huì)來(lái)看我的。

我在十二歲的時(shí)候堅(jiān)信他將來(lái)會(huì)娶我。在十三歲的時(shí)候?qū)λf(shuō),他讓我變得不一樣了。

他在我十四歲的時(shí)候告訴我,我的母親將死于癌癥。在我十六歲的時(shí)候教訓(xùn)了欺負(fù)我的男孩。

我二十歲的時(shí)候,他第一次遇見(jiàn)我。我激動(dòng)的對(duì)他說(shuō),我從小就認(rèn)識(shí)你了。

他三十歲的時(shí)候娶了我,在三十六歲的時(shí)候遇見(jiàn)了六歲的我。在四十三歲的時(shí)候死在了我的懷里,同時(shí)也是我十三歲那年,那個(gè)寒冷恍惚的清晨。

再次見(jiàn)到他,是我八十二歲那年,這個(gè)從童年起陪伴了我整個(gè)人生的男人。他溫柔的擁抱我,那時(shí),他四十三歲。

他參與了她全部的成長(zhǎng),他是她的愛(ài)人,她的丈夫,她孩子的父親。

他是穿越時(shí)空的,時(shí)間旅行者?!?/div>

 3 ) 唯美的愛(ài)情,淡淡的憂(yōu)傷

男主角很高很帥,女主角甜美溫婉。兩個(gè)人相遇相愛(ài),普通人的愛(ài)情,但因?yàn)槟兄鹘强偸菚?huì)莫名其妙的在不同的時(shí)空穿梭,這感情變得不一般。女主角要時(shí)不時(shí)忍受孤獨(dú),等待著未知的哪一天他突然消失,哪一天又突然離開(kāi)。因?yàn)楹⒆右簿哂袝r(shí)空穿梭的基因,總是突然流產(chǎn),多次以后,男主角不顧反對(duì)自己結(jié)扎了??墒菒?ài)一個(gè)人就想為他生孩子,女主角跟從之前穿梭過(guò)來(lái)的男主角xx終于有了一個(gè)不會(huì)消失的孩子。而男主角的死去是因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)巧合,出去打獵的他射中了穿梭過(guò)去的另一個(gè)自己。雖然他去了,但女主角仍在默默期待,哪一天,過(guò)去的他會(huì)穿梭過(guò)來(lái)再跟她見(jiàn)一面。而她終于等到了!在激動(dòng)的擁吻以后,他再次離開(kāi)。只留下淡淡憂(yōu)傷的妻子,默默的活下去。

如果有一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)回到過(guò)去,你還會(huì)希望再遇見(jiàn)他嗎?我想我不會(huì),我要的是可以牢牢抓在手心的幸福。

 4 ) 寫(xiě)給我未來(lái)的妻子

盡管我現(xiàn)在還不認(rèn)識(shí)你, 但我感覺(jué)我已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)你一輩子了. 從你還是一個(gè)六歲的姑娘, 穿著花裙子, 獨(dú)自到草坪上野餐的時(shí)候. 雖然是第一次見(jiàn)面,你可愛(ài)的笑容已經(jīng)打動(dòng)了我. 我們第一次拉手, 彼此已經(jīng)交換了信任和好感.

我還記得我們第二個(gè) "初次見(jiàn)面", 或許是在人潮洶涌的地鐵里, 或許是在學(xué)校的圖書(shū)館, 你傻傻的盯著我熱情的向我打招呼, 并邀請(qǐng)我去我最喜歡的那家餐館吃飯. 雖然我們素未蒙面, 但你嘴角美麗的笑容讓我沒(méi)辦法拒絕, 我知道我們將是完美的一對(duì).

我們會(huì)幸福的生活在一起, 即使沒(méi)遇到你之前我的房間非常邋遢, 甚至在我的洗臉架里面藏著我那個(gè)的時(shí)候需要的潤(rùn)滑液. 我會(huì)在和你一起生活的柴米油鹽中逐漸學(xué)會(huì)生命的意義 --- 我會(huì)學(xué)會(huì)和漸漸疏遠(yuǎn)的長(zhǎng)輩分享自己生活中的點(diǎn)點(diǎn)滴滴, 我已經(jīng)能感覺(jué)到對(duì)母親說(shuō)一句我愛(ài)你是那么的幸福; 我會(huì)更進(jìn)一步理解愛(ài)情的忠誠(chéng), 在每一次進(jìn)廚房后你從我?guī)Щ氐某写腥〕雒姘乃查g, 你我都那么相愛(ài); 我能體會(huì)女兒誕生過(guò)程中你受的艱辛; 我甚至開(kāi)始理解多年未聯(lián)系的父親對(duì)已故的母親那濃濃的思念, 當(dāng)然還有你那個(gè)最開(kāi)始一點(diǎn)都不喜歡我的哥哥, 現(xiàn)在我們已經(jīng)是很好的哥們兒了...... 最重要的是, 即使在我生命的最后一刻, 我仍然會(huì)重復(fù)那句我說(shuō)過(guò)很多次的話(huà), I love you, more than anything.

我們?cè)谝黄鸬娜兆永? 我們會(huì)和其他人一樣, 有歡笑, 有爭(zhēng)吵. 我有時(shí)候甚至?xí)竽凶又髁x的撒手而去, 讓你孤獨(dú)一人在家度過(guò)圣誕和新年. 但是我是愛(ài)你的, 我愿意在冷冷的雪天里坐在你單位外的椅子上等你下班然后向你道歉, 我知道你看到我認(rèn)錯(cuò)的誠(chéng)懇你就會(huì)原諒我.

我們?cè)谝黄鸬娜兆永? 我們可能會(huì)和其他人一樣, 想買(mǎi)好看的衣服, 想要更大的工作室和房子, 買(mǎi)輛更漂亮的車(chē). 相信我, 我會(huì)用別人不具備的能力為你賺到它們的.

我們?cè)谝黄鸬娜兆永? 我們也要和其他人一樣, 生一個(gè)英俊的大胖子或者美艷的小妞, 這樣我們的屋子里會(huì)多出一份笑聲, 你也一定會(huì)喜歡的.

在遇到你之前, 我內(nèi)心一直有數(shù)不清的想法和孤傲, 看不慣世間各種的丑惡與假善, 但我又必須和其他普通人一樣, 茫然又忙碌的活著這個(gè)世界上, 更多的是孤獨(dú)與寂寞.

直到我遇到你, 直到我為你套上戒指的剎那, 直到婚禮上看到你美麗的婚紗. 我愛(ài)你, 我未來(lái)的妻.



========================================================

后記: 我親愛(ài)的姥姥繼1992年我姥爺肝癌去世后, 于2009年9月辭世, 當(dāng)年她和姥爺也有過(guò)一段轟轟烈烈的愛(ài)情, 雖然已經(jīng)成為了歷史. 不過(guò)在我眼里, 他們之間的愛(ài)情和生活從未消失, 一切都還在那片綠綠的草原上上演著呢.

 5 ) 長(zhǎng)短句

一、多個(gè)時(shí)空


《純粹理性批判》中的第一經(jīng)驗(yàn)類(lèi)比(Analogies of Experience)要求在現(xiàn)象中有一個(gè)恒定且唯一之物來(lái)表象意識(shí)中的時(shí)間本身。恒定,或永恒,因?yàn)樽鳛榭傮w的時(shí)間本身是始終在那的;惟一,因?yàn)橹挥幸粋€(gè)時(shí)間。這個(gè)惟一且永恒的東西,即現(xiàn)象中的實(shí)體(Substance)??档旅鞔_把這個(gè)實(shí)體與洛克的托子(Substratum)區(qū)分開(kāi)來(lái),認(rèn)為實(shí)體是以各種方式顯現(xiàn)于人的,而不是像托子那樣不可知,也不顯現(xiàn)。

我要說(shuō),洛克的托子的作用是保證物的個(gè)體化與同一性。這個(gè)作用在康德那兒,似乎是由物自體和先驗(yàn)范疇共同完成。先驗(yàn)范疇組織現(xiàn)象,在使意識(shí)對(duì)現(xiàn)象的認(rèn)識(shí)成為可能的同時(shí),也使同一的意識(shí)本身成為可能——對(duì)先驗(yàn)對(duì)象的構(gòu)成即對(duì)自我的構(gòu)成。而物自體在這個(gè)過(guò)程中究竟如何起作用,不詳??档碌奈镒泽w與洛克的托子一樣,是個(gè)讓理論顯得尷尬,卻又不得不進(jìn)行的假設(shè)。

盡管康德反復(fù)說(shuō)現(xiàn)象中的實(shí)體不是洛克的托子,但這個(gè)實(shí)體究竟是什么,他又語(yǔ)焉不詳。出于他對(duì)牛頓力學(xué)的接受,有人嘗試將其理解為牛頓意義上的質(zhì)量。我論證過(guò),這樣的解讀將面臨一個(gè)兩難困境:如果實(shí)體是個(gè)體化了的質(zhì)量,時(shí)間便不是惟一的;如果實(shí)體是現(xiàn)象世界中的總質(zhì)量,基于二律背反的理由——這個(gè)總體無(wú)法成為經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)象——我們便無(wú)法經(jīng)驗(yàn)到它。(詳細(xì)論述見(jiàn)篇末附錄)

若是跳出康德闡釋?zhuān)∏耙粋€(gè)困境:時(shí)間不是惟一的,每個(gè)作為現(xiàn)象的物都意味著一個(gè)獨(dú)立的時(shí)間體系,我們就科幻了:空間中的一個(gè)一個(gè)的物,奠基著意識(shí)中的一個(gè)又一個(gè)時(shí)間系,我們可以生活在不同的時(shí)空中,當(dāng)我們經(jīng)驗(yàn)不同的物。甚至,對(duì)應(yīng)地說(shuō),我們總在成為另一個(gè)人,當(dāng)我們來(lái)到不同的時(shí)空。

于是,我情愿把亨利的生活看作對(duì)康德的一次失敗卻有趣的解讀。與其說(shuō)他是一位時(shí)間旅行者,一位不停地穿越時(shí)空的超人或可憐人,不如說(shuō),他的意識(shí)中并沒(méi)有一個(gè)絕對(duì)惟一的時(shí)間,他所來(lái)到并離開(kāi)的每一個(gè)時(shí)空,都是一個(gè)獨(dú)立自在的世界,盡管這些世界看上去很像,但哪個(gè)都不依賴(lài)于另一個(gè)——從理念的意義上說(shuō)。


二、沉默,或消失


影片的前半部分,亨利的突然消失被解釋為一種不治的遺傳疾病。沒(méi)有理由地,他時(shí)不時(shí)就去了另一個(gè)時(shí)空,赤身裸體地尋找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人來(lái)到一個(gè)新的環(huán)境,總是迫不及待地尋找一個(gè)身份,穿到自己身上。
亨利總會(huì)在一個(gè)無(wú)從預(yù)料的時(shí)刻消失,克萊爾生活在一個(gè)不確定的世界中。她的愛(ài)情是確定的,但她愛(ài)的人不確定地存在著。她的生活中彌漫著不確定性,而這恰好讓她格外珍惜亨利在她身邊的每一分鐘。

克萊爾一次次懷孕又一次次流產(chǎn),因?yàn)樘阂灿写┰桨Y,莫名其妙地,便在某個(gè)時(shí)刻,出離了子宮。但克萊爾最后一次懷孕時(shí),對(duì)亨利說(shuō),你每次消失都是因?yàn)楦杏X(jué)到了壓力。所以,從現(xiàn)在開(kāi)始,我要保持絕對(duì)地平靜,這樣胎兒就可以順利出生了。
看到這里,我恍然大悟,原來(lái)亨利的穿越癥是個(gè)隱喻,關(guān)于男人的隱喻:面對(duì)壓力,便會(huì)沉默與回避,這不正是男人的本能反應(yīng)么——而這在女人看來(lái),仿佛愛(ài)人去了另一個(gè)時(shí)空,不知何時(shí)才能回來(lái),甚至,會(huì)不會(huì)回來(lái)。

我查了查,電影改編自一位女造型藝術(shù)家的首部小說(shuō),寫(xiě)于一段失敗的戀情之后。原來(lái)如此。

很多年前聽(tīng)到過(guò)一個(gè)說(shuō)法:愛(ài)情,對(duì)男人來(lái)說(shuō),是掛在墻上的一幅畫(huà),你并不總是去看它;但對(duì)女人來(lái)說(shuō),則是房間里音樂(lè),你想不聽(tīng)都不行。所以,男人需要時(shí)不時(shí)地呆在純?nèi)粚儆谧晕业氖澜缋铮诔聊谐蔀樽约?。女人卻要認(rèn)為這是對(duì)她的疏遠(yuǎn)、對(duì)親密的疏離,并因此而坐立不安,想方設(shè)法闖進(jìn)那份鐵一般的沉默。結(jié)果,要么把自己撞疼,要么把愛(ài)情撞碎。
這是對(duì)小兒女情態(tài)的描述。若成年點(diǎn),便會(huì)更同情于另一個(gè)說(shuō)法:人生在世,無(wú)非是男人討慰藉,女人討生活。人并不總是需要慰藉,尤其在得意之時(shí)。人卻總在生活,就算你不想。


三、看著,卻無(wú)法改變


在一次穿越中,亨利來(lái)到母親身邊,在地鐵里,母親在看報(bào),他們作為陌生人簡(jiǎn)短卻親切的交談了一會(huì)兒。亨利告訴母親,他要結(jié)婚了,這個(gè)女孩讓他感到安全。
克萊爾問(wèn)他:你什么不去阻止那場(chǎng)車(chē)禍,既然你可以回到車(chē)禍發(fā)生之前?!拔覠o(wú)法阻止。無(wú)數(shù)次我回到過(guò)去,回到母親還在的時(shí)候,但每次我都無(wú)法改變發(fā)生著的一切?!薄@話(huà)讓人特別難過(guò)。我們并不能改變過(guò)去,就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么?很多時(shí)候,我們從自己當(dāng)下的境遇中抽身而出,試圖站在一個(gè)更開(kāi)闊的角度,超脫地看現(xiàn)在的糾結(jié)、焦慮,或苦悶,并自嘲這些都沒(méi)什么的。但當(dāng)你身在當(dāng)下,你知道未來(lái)的自己就坐在對(duì)面,笑著,看著自己,慈悲地。但你還是無(wú)法因此脫身而出。你仍然只能呆在你當(dāng)下的處境中,無(wú)論是過(guò)分的快樂(lè),還是仿佛無(wú)法掙脫的哀傷。

每一個(gè)時(shí)刻都是三維的,它包含著過(guò)去、現(xiàn)在,和未來(lái)這三個(gè)維度。我們?cè)诨貞浿芯庉嫊r(shí)間,編輯自己,有意無(wú)意地遺忘一些,并把另一些反復(fù)摩挲。過(guò)往明明滅滅,像晴天里,隨風(fēng)晃動(dòng)的百葉窗投在墻上的影子。每次回憶之后,我們都成為另一個(gè)人。
未來(lái)也是。未來(lái)無(wú)數(shù)次作為想象呈現(xiàn)于當(dāng)下,各式各樣地,仿佛清晰的回憶。回憶與憧憬,如同天平的兩臂,對(duì)稱(chēng)著,平衡著,在現(xiàn)在這個(gè)支點(diǎn)上。所以,現(xiàn)在這個(gè)時(shí)刻,最重。


四、期限


有天聚會(huì)時(shí),亨利中槍后痛苦掙扎的裸體突然出現(xiàn)在他們的門(mén)廳里。又消失了??巳R爾說(shuō),我從沒(méi)見(jiàn)過(guò)四十歲之后的你。我見(jiàn)過(guò)的你總是很年輕。從這個(gè)時(shí)候起,死亡就成了他們中的另一個(gè)在場(chǎng)者,盡管它總是沉默著。

亨利穿越到未來(lái),遇見(jiàn)了自己的已經(jīng)十歲的女兒。女兒告訴他,他死于自己五歲那年。她們一直很想念他。那時(shí)他們的女兒還沒(méi)出生。那時(shí)克萊爾還一如既往地希望與亨利白頭偕老,就像她還沒(méi)長(zhǎng)大時(shí)那樣,就像她長(zhǎng)大之后第一次遇到亨利時(shí)那樣,就像亨利死后,她仍然留著亨利所有的衣服,等著亨利回來(lái)那樣。

于她而言,亨利是不會(huì)死的。他無(wú)非是走遠(yuǎn)了一下子回不來(lái),他無(wú)非是在時(shí)空中迷了路,找不到一件讓他溫暖的衣服。

女兒五歲那年,亨利和克萊爾都已知道,亨利即將死去,中彈而死。期限降至,可能在任何一天,任何一個(gè)時(shí)刻。在它到來(lái)之前,所有相聚的時(shí)光都是銘刻,都是用最日常的方式來(lái)進(jìn)行的一次祭奠,一次追憶。當(dāng)這個(gè)期限還不確定,他們相愛(ài)著,仿佛一對(duì)最平凡的戀人;當(dāng)這個(gè)期限已然確定,他們相愛(ài)著,裝作不知道他們即將分離。

一個(gè)期限并不見(jiàn)得讓期限到來(lái)之前的一切都顯得美好。但,美好的東西都有一個(gè)期限。確定的期限,或不確定的期限。你不能試圖挽留,那會(huì)猶如握緊手中的細(xì)沙,握得越緊,便流失得越快,宛如時(shí)間,從指縫間悄然流走。
這個(gè)期限是否到來(lái),何時(shí)到來(lái),都不是你能選擇的。你能做的,僅僅是在它到來(lái)之前的每一刻,不讓自己在未來(lái)后悔——克萊爾明白這些,并且,她做到了。

而,這不正是人生么。


——————
附錄:On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…h(huán)ere the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

 6 ) 紅紅火火

我害怕走在人潮擁擠的地方 你知道那樣會(huì)更孤單 離開(kāi)的時(shí)候我們都一樣難過(guò) 很久很久以后也同樣感動(dòng) 你在那里 看著流星 一道一道劃過(guò)這里 沒(méi)有距離 我們的心慢慢靠近 時(shí)間旅行 在我的天地 感受著彼此的呼吸 一直在身邊 從沒(méi)走遠(yuǎn) 等待 牽著手走過(guò)灑滿(mǎn)星光的街頭 我知道那感覺(jué)更自由 離開(kāi)的時(shí)候我們也不怕寂寞 未來(lái)的路口 我們靜靜等候

 短評(píng)

很溫暖的一部電影,時(shí)空錯(cuò)位的愛(ài)情女主堅(jiān)持下來(lái)了。

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時(shí)空之妙幻

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她用一生的時(shí)間來(lái)等待和他的下一次相遇。

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電影果然不如書(shū)

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親愛(ài)的,我和過(guò)去的你搞了一搞,搞出了咱們未來(lái)的女兒,沒(méi)什么問(wèn)題吧

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我不怕等你,只怕你不再回來(lái)

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本來(lái)想感動(dòng)一把的...沒(méi)感覺(jué)啊

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沒(méi)有被感動(dòng)到。。。

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若你只是不巧穿越在我這個(gè)時(shí)空中的一瞬,我愿用一生等待下一次重逢

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時(shí)空穿梭,卻不能改變什么。所以,請(qǐng)珍惜眼前人。

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