奇愛(ài)博士是誰(shuí)?美國(guó)政府雇用的高級(jí)科研人員,負(fù)責(zé)研發(fā)用于冷戰(zhàn)的高尖端核武器以及相關(guān)的一系列攻擊防御系統(tǒng)。一個(gè)德裔美國(guó)人。一個(gè)籠罩在陰影中的癱子,坐輪椅的。一個(gè)右手戴著黑色皮手套行動(dòng)不正常的人。一個(gè)混入美國(guó)政府的納粹余孽。一個(gè)被惡魔控制的人。是的,惡魔。正如恰達(dá)耶夫不是思想,而是一種精神,被惡魔控制的精神。納粹,共產(chǎn)黨,蘇維埃,美國(guó)精神,資本主義,愛(ài)國(guó)主義統(tǒng)統(tǒng)都是惡魔。它們宣揚(yáng)一種仇恨,弱肉強(qiáng)食,優(yōu)勝劣汰的仇恨。以崇拜強(qiáng)權(quán)的名義宣揚(yáng)的一種仇恨。它們管這叫愛(ài)。愛(ài)國(guó),愛(ài)領(lǐng)袖云云。所以國(guó)家要強(qiáng)大,搞核競(jìng)賽,壓倒敵人。領(lǐng)袖要造神,萬(wàn)能,完美無(wú)缺,字字皆真理。
一個(gè)陽(yáng)痿的自大狂,一個(gè)被訓(xùn)練過(guò)度的飛行員(核戰(zhàn)英雄?牛仔帽暗示什么?),一個(gè)在地球表面被核輻射籠罩后,躲在地下礦井里仍要藏起一顆核彈與蘇聯(lián)繼續(xù)競(jìng)賽的美國(guó)將軍,一個(gè)陷入泥潭,無(wú)能為力的美國(guó)總統(tǒng),一個(gè)研發(fā)出毀滅世界的機(jī)器的國(guó)家政權(quán)。影片中,一切荒誕的,可笑的,恐怖的,都是惡魔受到人類崇拜后的產(chǎn)物。
現(xiàn)在冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束了,納粹早完蛋了,蘇聯(lián)也解體了。那么我們是否可以以較為輕松的心情來(lái)看這部電影呢?我覺(jué)得不大可能。因?yàn)橛捌斜憩F(xiàn)的一切細(xì)節(jié),現(xiàn)在依然成立。
(PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORKER, BY ERIC SCHLOSSER, ON JANUARY 23, 2014)
This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.
The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATO officers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?
With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”
President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.
In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.
* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”
After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.
Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.
Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.
* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.
The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.
The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”
Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.
While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”
The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”
A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.
In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.
“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.
___________________________________
AND THIS IS REALLY COOL:
Top secret documents released by the Pentagon:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-of-nuclear-war.html昨晚又溫習(xí)了一遍此片(我的硬盤長(zhǎng)期保留此片),再次證明了我的猜想。
片子的主體基本是主題政治荒誕劇,有反戰(zhàn)因素,但又不可否認(rèn)它的主題多元性,否則有很多場(chǎng)景、情節(jié)就難以解釋。
主題多元性點(diǎn)滴,想到哪里寫到哪里.
1、雄性暗示
片頭介紹了末日裝置的傳言,就是轟炸飛機(jī)空中加油的特寫,音樂(lè)是柔情的纏綿綿的,這里是個(gè)性行為暗示,看了片子畫面你就懂了。
機(jī)長(zhǎng)姓KONG,英語(yǔ)不好的不要怪我,這個(gè)姓在英語(yǔ)世界里只有大猩猩用過(guò),還是雄性的象征。
機(jī)長(zhǎng)騎著2000萬(wàn)噸級(jí)核彈興奮的落向蘇聯(lián)的導(dǎo)彈工廠,胯下的2000萬(wàn)噸級(jí)核彈也是一個(gè)勃起象征。
還有很多,比如狂人瑞披的關(guān)于性的“精華”談?wù)?,巴克將軍?duì)奇愛(ài)的1:10男女婚姻比例的向往和遐想……
雄性=暴力毀壞力+性欲求
這類暗示很多,自己去看吧
2、國(guó)家的軍事化和最終納粹化
奇愛(ài)原是德國(guó)人(他的原型里可能有德裔物理學(xué)家?jiàn)W托·漢因和弗里茨·施特拉斯曼的因素),如果你不知道這兩個(gè)家伙是誰(shuí),自己就別自以為自己能很懂這個(gè)片子,想理解影片內(nèi)涵的人要需要大致和導(dǎo)演相似的知識(shí)背景,這是必須的嘛。
現(xiàn)在他已經(jīng)從納粹科學(xué)家,經(jīng)骯臟的“洗白”歸化程序,而成為美國(guó)核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的技術(shù)總負(fù)責(zé)人,鑒于核武器的特殊用途,他同時(shí)也是總統(tǒng)的冷戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)略顧問(wèn),出席最高軍事會(huì)議。而且,最后核戰(zhàn)危機(jī)不可收拾的時(shí)刻,全體官僚、將軍都要問(wèn)計(jì)于他!這里的暗示已經(jīng)很清楚。
注意片子對(duì)博士身體上設(shè)置的幾個(gè)暗喻。
1. 他的那個(gè)假肢右臂,力量強(qiáng)大但又難以自制,時(shí)時(shí)忍不住行納粹軍禮,時(shí)時(shí)想扼死自己。(這是一個(gè)暗喻,手臂指什么?)
2. 在提出核戰(zhàn)末日應(yīng)對(duì)預(yù)案時(shí),博士的興奮勝于恐懼,甚至興奮得忘乎所以,語(yǔ)無(wú)倫次,聲音高吭而顫抖,竟幾次錯(cuò)誤地把總統(tǒng)稱為“我的元首!”(這是一個(gè)暗喻,元首指什么?)
3. 這個(gè)依靠輪椅行動(dòng)的癱子,竟然神跡般的站了起來(lái),(這里很可能反用了圣經(jīng)),見(jiàn)馬太福音第9章經(jīng)文:9:2 有人用褥子抬著一個(gè)癱子,到耶穌跟前來(lái)。耶穌見(jiàn)他們的信心,就對(duì)癱子說(shuō),小子,放心吧。你的罪赦了。 此經(jīng)常規(guī)的解釋見(jiàn)
http://www.hislambs.net/axr/luguang/jdj1-26.htm注意,片子最后一句對(duì)白也是博士以興奮、扭曲甚至有些許恐怖聲音說(shuō):“我的元首,我,我站起來(lái)了!”這是一個(gè)暗喻,癱子和站立指什么?)
奇愛(ài)博士這個(gè)人物的設(shè)定,實(shí)際是說(shuō):冷戰(zhàn)下的美國(guó)不僅要依靠納粹軍事科技,還必須依靠納粹政治思維才能生存下去。如同片中,奇愛(ài)博士不只提供核威懾的技術(shù)性咨詢,最后還為總統(tǒng)及全體官僚提出了一個(gè)核戰(zhàn)后“礦井社會(huì)”荒謬的整體社會(huì)規(guī)劃!換句話說(shuō),納粹主義已經(jīng)在冷戰(zhàn)陰影下慢慢復(fù)活了——癱子最終神跡般的站了起來(lái)就是一種象征。(個(gè)人觀點(diǎn),未經(jīng)導(dǎo)演本人確認(rèn)呵呵)
3、口是心非的冷戰(zhàn)式“和平”
片子里有個(gè)詼諧戲劇因素,口口聲聲標(biāo)榜傾向和平的人們實(shí)際上都是大戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)販子,這些情節(jié)另片子長(zhǎng)生了很不錯(cuò)的幽默效果。比如,
滿嘴外交辭令、裝的一本三正經(jīng)的的蘇聯(lián)大使閣下,實(shí)際上是個(gè)兼職竊照特務(wù),而且竊照職業(yè)病還控制不住,偷拍成癖;
戰(zhàn)略值班轟炸機(jī)基地是保證美國(guó)毀滅紅色世界(當(dāng)然地球也會(huì)全毀)的最后保證,基地的宣傳欄卻大書:我們的職業(yè)是和平;
屬于人民的蘇共總理,命令設(shè)計(jì)了被動(dòng)式引爆的末日裝置,敵人的任何核攻擊會(huì)啟動(dòng)這個(gè)地球的毀滅,且污染物持續(xù)100年。值得玩味的,美國(guó)人聽(tīng)到這消息幾乎沒(méi)有人恐懼,而是把它歸為訛詐伎倆。
總統(tǒng)的電話,為了解釋誤會(huì),大說(shuō)“掃瑞”那段,幾乎成了中國(guó)相聲。
巴克將軍是口是心非冷戰(zhàn)式“和平”的集中表演者,他給總統(tǒng)匯報(bào)瑞皮發(fā)了瘋擅自發(fā)動(dòng)R計(jì)劃時(shí),大家可以看到他實(shí)際上是興奮得不能自制,但在總統(tǒng)面前還要板著臉悔過(guò)這次指揮“失誤”。說(shuō)了沒(méi)一會(huì)兒,就轉(zhuǎn)到了慫恿總統(tǒng)將計(jì)就計(jì)、全面進(jìn)攻蘇聯(lián)的新話題了。當(dāng)全部飛機(jī)召回,可憐的巴克選入了深深的失望,但蘇共總理抗議有一架漏網(wǎng)時(shí),他幾乎高興得手舞足蹈:太妙了,又可以毀滅蘇聯(lián)——全部公產(chǎn)主義——以及整個(gè)地球了?。。?br>
?。≒.S.鳥籠山的傻大木臺(tái)詞,也有異曲同工之妙:“等我把地球毀滅了,我給你們發(fā)獎(jiǎng)金!” 真可媲美了。)
4.敵意+封閉+瘋狂=冷戰(zhàn)式隔閡
影片的故事發(fā)生地主要有三處:
一是美國(guó)國(guó)防部作戰(zhàn)室;高不見(jiàn)頂?shù)木薮蠛诎悼臻g,只有聚光燈下巨大的會(huì)議圓桌前一張張政要的面孔,以及那幅大板蘇聯(lián)地圖;
二是KONG機(jī)長(zhǎng)的B-52轟炸機(jī)座艙、控制室和炸彈艙,一派性質(zhì)盎然的節(jié)日氣氛;
三是空軍基地的外景和辦公室內(nèi)景。
片子一開(kāi)始。三者之間據(jù)不再有溝通關(guān)系,各行其是,因?yàn)榇蚶鋺?zhàn)、怕竊聽(tīng)、反間諜、被敵人干擾一系列專業(yè)味道十足的理由,封閉了幾乎所有的溝通渠道。
即使在每一個(gè)場(chǎng)景內(nèi),人與人之間也難以溝通。馳援機(jī)場(chǎng)的小隊(duì)被守軍無(wú)情的伏擊,是為了防止俄軍冒充偷襲;面對(duì)英國(guó)副手,瑞皮語(yǔ)言時(shí)而大談其“體液哲學(xué)”,時(shí)而不著邊際,時(shí)而瘋?cè)睡傉Z(yǔ);作戰(zhàn)室里的熱線電話打嘴架,軍事官僚們對(duì)總統(tǒng)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)誘惑、話題轉(zhuǎn)移,與蘇聯(lián)大使的斗嘴和扭打。
庫(kù)布里克運(yùn)用“隔閡”來(lái)敘事,在講不清道理的困境中,將道理講清了,呵呵,形成了獨(dú)特的敘事風(fēng)格。
5。角色七人談
彼得在片子里一人演三角
第一個(gè)是美國(guó)空軍基地司令副官曼德里克,典型文職英國(guó)空軍,娘娘腔,有些雌化,總把紳士文雅字眼掛嘴上,這一副手也恰恰符合了冷戰(zhàn)形勢(shì)中“英國(guó)是美國(guó)的跟班"的說(shuō)法。曼德里克再美國(guó)老大面前很膽小,軟弱,溫順,顯得有些,但是骨子里還是有點(diǎn)小倔強(qiáng)、責(zé)任感的,這個(gè)小人物似乎比那些大人物們要更人性一些。
第二個(gè)是戴眼鏡、大禿頂?shù)拿绹?guó)總統(tǒng),思維有些亂,說(shuō)話有點(diǎn)飄,片中給他個(gè)人的頭部特寫鏡頭幾乎沒(méi)有,總都是把他“淹沒(méi)”在一群政客幕僚的簇?fù)碇?,大廳的黑暗更顯得他渺小、不重要。也許是表現(xiàn),他不過(guò)是一個(gè)職業(yè)政客身份特征,刻畫出了他毫無(wú)主見(jiàn)。
第三個(gè)是奇愛(ài)博士,核心人物,一個(gè)笑容略帶智慧、輕蔑與滑稽的核戰(zhàn)策劃家。雖然是坐著輪椅殘疾人(暗喻遭到重創(chuàng)的納粹主義),但是他和偉大的納粹元首一樣,長(zhǎng)于演說(shuō)鼓動(dòng)、感情豐富、易激動(dòng)、動(dòng)作幅度特別大、時(shí)不時(shí)地習(xí)慣性抽動(dòng)僵硬的軀體,滿天吐沫星子的大談其末日設(shè)想,給人的印象絕對(duì)的深刻。這個(gè)人物在影片中的顯得非常突兀搶眼,他究竟代表著什么呢,也許他并不代表著某個(gè)人,應(yīng)該是代表冷戰(zhàn)、核戰(zhàn)的精神源頭。
這三個(gè)人,你看得出來(lái)都是一個(gè)演員演得么?向老庫(kù)致敬吧各位
第四個(gè)是空軍基地司令瑞皮,意識(shí)形態(tài)中毒深重的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狂人,注意,導(dǎo)演多次用仰角鏡頭拍攝他的臉部特色,那根大雪茄不正代表著他的雄型勃起么。
第五個(gè),轟炸機(jī)指揮官“剛”少校,又是個(gè)意識(shí)形態(tài)中毒深重的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狂人,他切斷一切與外界的聯(lián)系,開(kāi)始興奮,發(fā)表激進(jìn)的演說(shuō)來(lái)激勵(lì)下屬,最后騎著核彈頭興奮呼叫著,掉下去實(shí)現(xiàn)了他的核戰(zhàn)英雄夢(mèng)
第六個(gè),巴克將軍似乎對(duì)和平不關(guān)心,還是個(gè)意識(shí)形態(tài)中毒深重的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狂人,當(dāng)然對(duì)女人除外,他對(duì)性感的女秘書竟然說(shuō)著兒語(yǔ)調(diào)情。但是一旦得知事態(tài)的嚴(yán)重,他慌神得比誰(shuí)都厲害,在作戰(zhàn)室內(nèi)的滑稽舉動(dòng),他不是不安,而是內(nèi)心興奮與激動(dòng),和“剛”少校不相上下。
第七個(gè),巴克的女秘書兼情人,這是片中唯一的女人,所以不得不提,出現(xiàn)的場(chǎng)景極其有限,基本就是個(gè)花瓶。政治與女人無(wú)關(guān),但是與性有關(guān)。看看不多的幾個(gè)鏡頭的色情味,難道還不夠性暗示么?
2010.5.31再次修改
庫(kù)布里克,很善于玩轉(zhuǎn)黑色幽默。
電影《光榮之路》中,法國(guó)陸軍將軍下達(dá)了一個(gè)士兵們根本無(wú)法完成的任務(wù),當(dāng)任務(wù)失敗,士兵撤退時(shí),這位將軍痛下黑手,準(zhǔn)備讓沒(méi)有吃到德國(guó)槍子兒的士兵,嘗嘗法國(guó)的槍子兒。
《全金屬外殼》里,士兵小丑頭上寫著“天生殺手”,胸前別著“和平印章”的行為藝術(shù)裝扮,是庫(kù)布里克對(duì)美國(guó)越戰(zhàn)赤裸而無(wú)情的諷刺。
這兩部電影中,處處可見(jiàn)黑色幽默。而真正讓庫(kù)布里克成為黑色幽默大師的,是《奇愛(ài)博士》。
這部被稱為庫(kù)布里克“未來(lái)三部曲”之一的電影,表達(dá)了庫(kù)布里克對(duì)人類未來(lái)的基本看法:人類的未來(lái)就是沒(méi)有未來(lái) 。
1964年,電影上映,冷戰(zhàn)還未結(jié)束,庫(kù)布里克送去了一份禮物,在此之前還從未有人敢如此戲弄戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。
一、
美蘇兩大陣營(yíng)冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期,美國(guó)空軍基地的一位空軍將軍突然下達(dá)命令,啟動(dòng)R計(jì)劃,34架攜帶數(shù)千萬(wàn)噸核彈的飛機(jī)進(jìn)攻蘇聯(lián)。(相當(dāng)于整個(gè)二戰(zhàn)期間核彈量的11倍)
這意味將爆發(fā)一場(chǎng)核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。
這位瑞皮將軍,是私自下達(dá)命令的,并切斷了和華盛頓總部的一切通訊設(shè)備,事前他沒(méi)有報(bào)告他的上級(jí)圖吉德森將軍,更沒(méi)有經(jīng)過(guò)總統(tǒng)的簽字。
他瘋了嗎?為什么這么做呢。
原來(lái)這位看著強(qiáng)悍高大,嘴里喜歡叼著雪茄的將軍,性生活有問(wèn)題,所以他不能征服女人,就要用炮彈征服世界,推行極端的種族主義。
他這一點(diǎn)倒是很像那位發(fā)動(dòng)第二次世界大戰(zhàn)的元首希特勒,
于是乎,瑞皮將軍因?yàn)樽约旱碾[疾,把冷戰(zhàn)變成熱戰(zhàn),第三次世界大戰(zhàn)一觸即發(fā)。
二、
得知這一消息的圖吉德森將軍,并沒(méi)有顯示出生氣和驚訝,因?yàn)榇藭r(shí)他還在跟他的女秘書打情罵俏。
等他在作戰(zhàn)室平淡的把這一信息告訴總統(tǒng)梅爾金時(shí),總統(tǒng)慌了。而他依然像個(gè)沒(méi)事人一樣若無(wú)其事,甚至還接到女秘書打來(lái)的一通抱怨電話,在核武器準(zhǔn)備進(jìn)攻蘇聯(lián)的時(shí)候,他還在安撫女友的情緒,許諾將來(lái)一定將她扶正。
同時(shí),也可以看出,圖吉德森將軍是一個(gè)好戰(zhàn)分子。對(duì)于阻止這一行動(dòng),他向總統(tǒng)表示無(wú)計(jì)可施。對(duì)于先發(fā)制人,進(jìn)攻蘇聯(lián),他倒是激情四射。
三、
當(dāng)梅爾金總統(tǒng)電話告知蘇聯(lián)總理時(shí),這位總理喝的醉醺醺的,像個(gè)女人一樣喋喋不休的鬧情緒。
此時(shí),蘇聯(lián)大使透漏一個(gè)驚天秘聞:只要蘇聯(lián)遭到進(jìn)攻,會(huì)立即啟動(dòng)“世界末日機(jī)器”,可以毀滅地球上所有生物和人類。
作為美國(guó)戰(zhàn)略顧問(wèn)的奇愛(ài)博士,這種機(jī)器是電腦程序設(shè)定好的,一旦有人想關(guān)閉它,它就會(huì)自動(dòng)爆炸。
這位奇愛(ài)博士本來(lái)就是德國(guó)人,曾經(jīng)為納粹服務(wù),二戰(zhàn)后移民美國(guó)。雖然改名換姓,依然遏制不住心中的法西斯情節(jié),身殘志堅(jiān)的致力于摧毀這個(gè)世界。
核彈在蘇聯(lián)基地爆炸后,奇愛(ài)博士提出了一項(xiàng)“人類精英計(jì)劃“:從數(shù)十億人口選中幾十萬(wàn)人藏于深埋地下的礦井中,等到百年后,核污染散去,才重返陸上。
這位坐著輪椅的奇愛(ài)博士,每次說(shuō)到激動(dòng)點(diǎn)的時(shí)候,他總會(huì)脫口而出,大喊“我的元首”。更為滑稽的是,他的右臂會(huì)不受控制的自動(dòng)行“納粹禮”。
當(dāng)奇愛(ài)博士提到“人類精英計(jì)劃”中的男女比例是1:10時(shí),在場(chǎng)的男士們沸騰了,因?yàn)檫@將意味著人類將取消“一夫一妻制”,連蘇聯(lián)大使都稱贊這是好主意。而最興奮的莫過(guò)于圖吉德森將軍,他聽(tīng)的兩眼發(fā)光,也許他和女秘書之間的秘密情史終于可以正大光明的進(jìn)行了。
四、
一場(chǎng)毀滅人類的核武器大戰(zhàn)爆發(fā),而并沒(méi)有人真正關(guān)心。
整個(gè)統(tǒng)治世界的男人們,不是吃著口香糖想女人,就是想著如何盡快行動(dòng),如何盡快占領(lǐng)地下礦井,好在下一輪的兩大陣營(yíng)的對(duì)立面中占據(jù)優(yōu)勢(shì)。
最后,奇愛(ài)博士,再次想出一個(gè)絕妙計(jì)劃的時(shí)候,殘疾的雙腿竟然奇跡般的站起來(lái)了,這是是一個(gè)巨大的隱喻:意味著納粹重生。
其實(shí)奇愛(ài)博士、瑞皮將軍、圖吉德森將軍,他們是三位一體的,他們是戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的設(shè)計(jì)者、發(fā)起者、受益者。世界是他們的,而游戲規(guī)則從未變過(guò)。
撕下文明的外衣,庫(kù)布里克表示,人類的未來(lái)就是沒(méi)有未來(lái)。
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三大場(chǎng)景:機(jī)艙、作戰(zhàn)室、基地。過(guò)半場(chǎng)登場(chǎng)龍?zhí)啄衅鎼?ài)博士。騎氫彈的牛仔。向可口可樂(lè)公司要硬幣的英國(guó)紳士。
正經(jīng)的喜劇,通篇的諷刺,瘋子的憂傷,好看得喪心病狂。
94/100 你知道把整個(gè)時(shí)代的恐懼和幻想如此直觀的拍出來(lái)有多難嗎?
彼得塞勒斯和喬治斯科特都逗不過(guò)那個(gè)德州口音的機(jī)長(zhǎng)
這個(gè)譯名太囧了,看的好累中間還睡了,大腦都空白了。哦天
庫(kù)布里克從來(lái)不讓人失望
當(dāng)年此片竟然全面敗給窈窕淑女,奧斯卡這哪是中庸保守,根本就是腦殘。
想想也是理所當(dāng)然,如果一場(chǎng)核爆為男人帶來(lái)的不是恐懼而是破處似的快感,他們當(dāng)然會(huì)從此開(kāi)始大幹特幹呀……
第一次接觸庫(kù)布里克的片子,倍受打擊~~
Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room!
黑色戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)片,戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與男人,戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與性,導(dǎo)演描述得太隱晦太有魅力了。最后昆少將騎著導(dǎo)彈轟炸敵人陣地,實(shí)在太酷了,那是每個(gè)男 性的夢(mèng)想。
雖然是冷戰(zhàn)的時(shí)代背景,但達(dá)摩克利斯之劍高懸于人類頭頂?shù)氖聦?shí)遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有改變。在漫長(zhǎng)的最后一分鐘營(yíng)救中,展現(xiàn)官僚的無(wú)能、人性的罪惡、和某種奇異的幽默感,在世界還未毀滅時(shí)他們已經(jīng)想著在新世界瓜分利益了(以人類之名),對(duì)俄國(guó)、英國(guó)、德國(guó)人都采取了典型化處理。極端的戲劇沖突展示深刻的當(dāng)代現(xiàn)實(shí)。
給庫(kù)爺跪了,不僅僅是起源的設(shè)想者,還是末日的預(yù)言者啊,他大概不是地球人。演博士的哥分飾三個(gè)角色,不僅讓觀眾來(lái)勁,他自己也一定爽得要命吧
你可以毀滅世界,但不許在作戰(zhàn)室打架!這里是作戰(zhàn)室!
沒(méi)看懂,好像有黑色幽默的地方在嘛就是覺(jué)得不好笑...科幻控可能會(huì)看懂?
Dr. Strangelove比Dr. Strange更懂愛(ài)。
關(guān)注冷戰(zhàn)史必看
液體的純潔
Mein Führer, I can walk!
7.0 最好的政治諷刺劇沒(méi)有之一。庫(kù)布里克用這部氟化水一般的電影玷污了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)機(jī)器們最純潔的體液。